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ABSTRACT    
 
Based on an original database, this paper provides an empirical study of Tsarist bond 
prices reactions after their repudiation by the Soviets. For the two years following the 
repudiation two striking features of a representative Tsarist bond traded in Paris are 
highlighted: first, the price decline following the repudiation announcement was limited; 
second the price remained relatively high, and even increased. This is the so-called Soviet 
Repudiation Puzzle. We argue that the bonds’ persistent high relative value can be 
approached via the Peso problem hypothesis: prices are affected by expected events that never 
took place and thus remained unobservable. In the Russian case, several unusual events could 
have been expected: a dramatic change in the Russian attitude, due for instance to the Soviet 
overthrow or a takeover of part of the debt either by the French or by another government 
(most likely countries created from the former Russian Empire). In this respect, the Soviet 
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Why Do Investors Still Hope? 









On February 8, 1918, a rumor feared by investors became reality: an official Soviet 
decree repudiated all bonds issued by the Tsarist government. As a consequence, one would 
expect bond prices to drop dramatically and remain close to zero. Surprisingly, they exhibited 
a very different pattern. The day following the repudiation, a representative Russian bond, 
floated on the Paris stock exchange
1 in 1906, was still traded at 55% of its par value and the 
following week, the bond lost a mere 2.73%. Eventually, from this date up to end 1919, the 
bond price remained higher than 45% and even more striking, almost two years later, on 
October 21, 1919, it increased to 62.5% of its par value. These extremely puzzling facts are 
referred to as the “Soviet Repudiation Puzzle”.  
 
In order to solve the puzzle, this paper analyses the price evolution of a representative 
Tsarist bond during the two years following the repudiation (1918-1919). Several possible 
clues are examined, involving all events or news that could affect the perception that the 
bonds would be at least partially repaid. Most interestingly, this leads to consider the impact 
of several rare events: the repudiation of a foreign bond, the dismemberment of an empire 
leading to the creation of new countries, a civil war and a world war (WWI). Before the 
empirical analysis and in order to see the problem in its true perspective, the sovereign debt 
issues, the impact on bond prices of rare events and the financial repercussions of the Soviet 
repudiation are briefly discussed hereafter. 
 
In a survey on sovereign debt emphasizing the theoretical motivations to repay, Eaton 
and Fernandez (1995) put forward the importance of reputation, punishments, rewards and 
renegotiation. Eichengreen (1989) and Lindert and Morton (1989) analyze the long-term 
impact of defaulting and find that defaulting in the 1930's had no impact regarding credit 
                                                 
1 At the time, Russian assets were actively traded on the Paris stock exchange and held by a large fraction of 
French investors. In order to strengthen diplomatic relations with Russia, the French government had, since the 
1890’s, helped to float Russian bonds. This led to a very large diffusion of Russian securities, mainly state and 
railway bonds, among the French middle class. In 1919, as the French government centralized the claims related 
to French interests in Russia, 1.6 million investors filled in a form. According to Girault (1974), the Russian 
section represented 33% of foreign securities and amounted to approximately 4.5% of French private wealth. 
Furthermore, France centralized most Russian financial assets at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
approximately 40% to 45% of Russian sovereign debts. Ukhov (2003) estimates that foreigners held 49.7% of 
Russian government debts in 1913. According to the Office national des valeurs mobilières, the amounts 
invested in Russian shares and bonds before WWI reached 15 to 18 billion francs (“Note sur la création d’un 
comité français de protection des intérêts français en Russie”, Office national des valeurs mobilières, 22/1/1918, 
ANPFVM 440-A-17).   3
terms in the 1970's. However, according to Özler (1993), "the spreads on rescheduled loans 
are more than twice those on new loans during the 1978-80 period". Claessens and Pennachi 
(1996) and Ureche-Rangau (2003) determine to which extent market prices provide 
information regarding the probability of default on sovereign bonds.  
 
Few researchers have analyzed bond prices after their repudiation. Up to the XIX
th 
century, repudiations were rather common and as stated by Wells and Wills (2000) “history is 
replete with examples of sovereigns reneging on their debts”. However, in order to avoid 
commercial retaliations, governments were usually reluctant to repudiate international debts. 
This explains why, before 1917, only a very limited number of countries had repudiated their 
foreign debt (Borchard (1951)). The French market had to cope, in 1834, with the Dona Maria 
government repudiation of Portuguese bonds issued by Dom Miguel during the civil war. 
According to Borchard (1951) these bonds were quoted on the Bourse until September 1837, 
by which time their price had dropped from about 400 francs for a par value of 1000 francs to 
120. The Paris stock exchange remained nonetheless open to new Portuguese loans. However, 
as bondholders’ associations successfully lobbied to boycott Portuguese securities, French 
bankers could hardly market these loans. By 1890, the boycott had pushed the Portuguese 
government back to the negotiation table, leading to an agreement on 1891. In 1864, French 
investors faced again repudiation: the Mexican government led by Juarez refused to recognize 
Maximilian’s debts. The French government, which had largely helped to issue the loans on 
its markets, agreed to reimburse its nationals to the extent of approximately 50% of the 
invested amounts. By recognizing a moral duty to take over part of Maximilian’s debt, the 
French government created a precedent. Besides the “moral” aspect stemming from the high 
profile the French government had in the bond issue, it is likely that it reimbursed part of the 
Mexican debts in order to minimize the impact on French bondholders’ wealth. The French 
government position may have led to two kind of moral hazard attitude. In the Russian case, 
knowing that the French government would probably back them in case of trouble, French 
investors may have invested more heavily in Russian securities. On the other hand, if France 
was going to repay part of the debt, Soviets had no incentive to fulfill the Tsarist obligations
2. 
 
There is, to our knowledge, no study tracking the sovereign bond price evolution of a 
country, which breaks up. When this happens, the public debt is to be partitioned. The 1877-
1878 Russian-Ottoman war led to the creation of many new countries making secession from 
the Ottoman Empire. The Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin (1878) discussed the allocation 
of the Ottoman Debt. The Treaty of Berlin recognized the principle of state succession and 
provided that a portion of the Ottoman debt should be assigned on an equitable basis to 
Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia. The Treaty of Lausanne (1924) settled the «equitable 
basis». At the time, specialists in international law, (Bonfils (1914)), stated that each new 
country should take the interest burden in proportion to land, people or tax revenues.  
 
The impact of war events on bond prices has been studied in different contexts. Davis 
and Pecquet (1990) analyze the Confederate bond price reactions during the Civil War and 
find a link between their evolution and the Gettysburg defeat, the fall of Vicksburg and 
Atlanta. For the same war, Willard, Guinnane and Rosen (1996) study the Greenback's gold 
price movements and find a significant link between war events and bond prices. Frey and 
Kucher (2000, 2001) analyze the monthly evolution of five European government bonds 
traded on the Swiss Bourse between 1928 and 1948. They find that some major events are not 
                                                 
2 This sort of moral hazard is nowadays subject to a debate regarding IMF’s role. For a recent survey on this 
debate see Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001).   4
incurring any significant price change. Waldenström and Frey (2002) run the same analysis 
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. They find that there are large discrepancies between 
events considered as major turning points nowadays by historians and events perceived as 
important at the time. Oosterlinck (2003) shows that there is a premium for French bonds 
issued before versus during the war. The breakpoints on this premium are mainly linked to 
political changes and reassessments regarding the legitimacy of French rulers. Brown and 
Burdekin (2002) isolate structural breaks and turning points on German bonds traded in 
London during World War II. The outbreak of WWII and the D-Day invasion appear to be 
major turning points. Furthermore, these authors suggest that the bond prices anticipate 
Hitler's overthrow and the post-war settlement of bondholders’ claim. 
 
The economic oriented literature dealing with the repudiation of the Tsarist debt 
focuses on macroeconomic aspects. The Russian monetary problems, stemming from the 
repudiation, have been studied extensively in the 1920’s (Apostol and Michelson (1922), 
Comité des banques russes à Paris (1921), Raffalovitch (1922)). More recently, Freymond 
(1995) has provided a financial approach about the French investors’ losses and feelings. He 
shows that the attitude towards the repudiated bonds differs according to the countries where 
they were traded: ranging from a small financial involvement (pay one or two coupons and 
then leave the investors to their fate), to full reimbursement. For bondholders located out of 
Russia, international pressures and potential negotiations enter into account. However, these 
negotiations are hampered by the size and political influence of the repudiating country, 
Soviet Union being one of the main twentieth century powers.  
 
The following study differs from the previous approaches in at least two respects. 
First, it uses an original quantitative (bond prices) and qualitative 9Archives from the 
ANPFVM
3) database to determine which events investors considered, at the time, as 
important. Second, it aims at showing, in the light of modern financial theory, why investors 
kept hoping after the Soviet repudiation decree. Even after the repudiation, three potential 
payers remained. First, if the Bolsheviks were overthrown, a new Russian government would 
probably reimburse the debt. Second, newly created countries, such as Poland or the Baltic 
States were according to international law, responsible for part of the debt. Lastly, as the 
French government had a high responsibility for the bonds’ sale among the French public, 
investors could reasonably hope to see France fulfill part of the Russian obligations. The 
analysis seeks to determine to which extent each piece of information played a role in the 
bond valuation, allowing thus to disentangle the puzzle.  
 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
and addresses the market microstructure issue. Section 3 analyses potential explanations for 
the puzzle related to the issuing country’s fate, Section 4 studies the elements specific to 
France, the place where the bonds are traded. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 
                                                 
3 Association Nationale des Porteurs Français de Valeurs Mobilières.    5
2. The data series and market microstructure 
 
The data series have been collected in the Bulletin de la Cote de la Compagnie des 
Agents de Change de Paris
4 on a daily basis for a period stretching from January 1, 1918 to 
December 31, 1919. The data consists of the daily price series, on the Paris Stock Exchange, 
of a Russian long-term (50 years) bond issued in 1906
5 and paying a yearly 5% coupon
6. This 
bond was one of the most liquid Russian issues. Actually, it was exchanged on several 
markets but serial numbers were specific to a given stock exchange
7. According to Freymond 
(1995), 72% of the 1906 bonds were traded in Paris. The war outbreak soon stopped 
international arbitrage and measures taken on a particular market had no effect elsewhere.  
 
  Table 1 shows that bond prices kept an average of 56.1% of par value (this is the 
“dirty price” usually quoted at the time). The mean value and the median are both very high: 
for instance, the mean of a German bond traded on the London Stock Exchange following the 
outbreak of WWII remained between 0 and 20% (Brown and Burdekin (2002)) during the war 
period. The minimum value (45%) is also in sharp contrast with this case. 
 
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics: Bond price and daily return (1918-1919) 
 
  Bond Price  Working Day Returns Daily return 
Mean  56.1 0.00%  0.00% 
Median  56.5 0.00%  0.00% 
Maximum  66.5 8.70%  6.53% 
Minimum  45 -7.00%  -3.77% 
Standard deviation  5.52 1.54%  1.34% 
Skewness  -0.22 0.59  0.64 
Kurtosis  2.09 6.84 4.95 
 
 
Daily returns are computed as follows:  
 
rt = (Pt+1 – Pt + Dt)/Pt , 
 
with Pt the price at date t and Dt, the dividend paid at date t.  
 
In order to take into account the periods of stock exchange closure, working day 
returns are computed. When daily returns are available, working day returns equal daily 
returns. When it is not possible to compute a daily return (because the stock exchange is 
closed n days), a “working day” return is computed as: 
 
rt = (Pt+n –Pt +Dt) /Pt.  
 
                                                 
4 I thank M.  Gallais-Hamonno and Ms. Bodilsen for their help and availability when collecting the data 
respectively at the Université d'Orléans and at the SBF. 
5 The 1909 Russian bond with a 4.5% coupon exhibits the same trend. 
6 Due on May 1 and November 1, expressed in different currencies but based on a common gold reference. 
7 The series with a number between 1 and 273 were traded in Paris (with those between 241 and 273 also 
exchanged in Vienna), those between 274 and 339 in London and those from 340 to 350 in Amsterdam.   6
These returns are used in the remaining part of the paper
8. They are on average close to zero 
but on some dates can reach extreme values (see Appendix 1).  
 
The return distribution is rather symmetric: mean and median have the same value and 
the skewness is equal to 0.59; thus small. Furthermore, the distribution is leptokurtic, a 
common feature in bond return series.  
 
For the period under study, and according to Macmillan (2003), in view of the 
troubled times, Russian news or telegrams could take days or weeks, to reach their 
destination. It is crucial to take this element into account in order to determine Russian news’ 
impact. In order to deal with the potential time span, three day lagged and weekly returns are 
also computed and analyzed. Especially for very troubled periods, it is interesting to 
determine to what extent the recorded prices corresponded to real trades. Information on this 
matter has been collected in the contemporaneous press and the Bulletin de la Cote de la 
Compagnie des Agents de Change de Paris. 
 
From 1917 to 1919, the Russian section of the Paris Stock Exchange experienced 
some periods of very low activity. Unfortunately, no archive mentions the daily volumes. The 
Bulletin de la Cote de la Compagnie des Agents de Change de Paris gives the number of 
price changes, which provides an indication of the market activity. For the studied bond, there 
is, most of the time, more than one change a day, implying that several trades took place. 
However, the volume of these trades is unknown, thus numbers of trades must be taken with 
caution. The French financial press also gives a record of the periods of total inactivity. For 
example, on December 12, 1917, Le Rentier described the Russian bonds market as “non 
existing as the sell orders do not find a counterpart”
9. During the following month the market 
remained extremely narrow and it was impossible to exchange large quantities of bonds
10. In 
September, the market for Russian securities, which had been virtually inexistent for several 
months, experienced a renewed activity
11. In January 1919 however, the trade in Russian 
securities almost disappeared from the market. This inactivity continued up to March 1919
12. 
End April the number of daily quotations exhibited an upward trend, until August. In its 
August 27, 1919 issue, the Rentier’s journalists believed that the quoted prices were mainly 
buy prices for capitalists ready to take a substantial risk and expecting Russia to recover from 
its current situation. In September, the Paris market for Russian securities seemed deserted
13. 
During October, they experienced a renewed activity that stopped after November 1919. In 
view of these various comments, the homogeneity of the prices may be questioned.  
 
                                                 
8 With 536 observations for working day returns and 411 for daily ones, the use of daily returns would lead to a 
serious loss of information. Furthermore as the stock exchange is opened 6 days a week from October to May 
and 5 days a week from June to September, the number of observations would suffer from a greater bias. Table 1 
gives nonetheless the descriptive statistics for daily returns. 
9 The author has translated quotations from French journals. 
10 Le Rentier, March 27, 1918. 
11 Journal des Valeurs Russes, September 14, 1918. 
12 Le Rentier, January 7, and March 17, 1919. 
13 The Economist, September 6 and 13, 1919.   7
Table 2 summarizes the periods of low and high activity during 1918 and 1919 
according to the current press archives and the reported number of trades.  
 







































3. Does the SRP explanation lie in Russia… 
 
The SRP stems from two major stylized facts: after the repudiation and up to 
December 1919, the 1906 bond price never fell below 45% of par value and in 1919 it 
experienced a large increase. This section describes first the different Russian actors’ position 
towards the debt recognition, then the newly created countries and ends with the description 
of the military evolution during the civil war. In each case, a historical presentation is 
provided, then, their impact on the bond prices is analyzed. 
 
Graph 2 and 3 relate the bond price evolution during 1918 and 1919 to the events, 
linked to Russia, which have the main impact on the bonds.  
 
Russian Governments and debt repudiation: historical presentation 
 
During the Russian civil war, many new political actors arose
14. Ex post, most of them 
had a short-lived influence on Russian politics. However, ex ante and especially for foreign 
investors, it was difficult to determine who would become or remain important. Therefore, 
any statement regarding the debt made by a potential future leader could have an impact on 
the Russian bond prices. Appendix 2 gives an overview of the various declarations made with 
regard to the debt repayment and their impact on the bond prices. 
                                                 
14 At the end of August 1918, there were no less than 30 governments operating on the former Tsarist Empire! 
(Salomoni (1997)).   8
 
GRAPH 2: Bond price evolution and events happening in Russia in 1918 
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Council of Four 
recognizes Kolchak
Anti-Kolckhak 
revolt in Irkutsk  11
As soon as January 13, 1918 rumors regarding the repudiation were circulating. 
According to the Financial Times
15, at the London Stock Exchange: “Russian bonds were an 
outstanding feature of weakness owing to the reported drastic action of the Bolsheviks against 
foreign creditors (…). The Petrograd message announcing that the Supreme Council of the 
National Economy have drafted a decree declaring null and void all national bonds issued by 
the Imperial and Bourgeois Government, (…) which is held by foreigners, naturally had a bad 
effect on Russian bonds.” However, in its January 17, 1918 issue, the Financial Times’ 
journalist felt that “Russian bonds, the market for which was still weak, though from the 
extent of the fall in prices it was evident that the proposal of the present administration to 
repudiate foreign loans is not taken seriously as would be the case if the Government were 
considered a stable one”. The French investors had the same feeling towards the Soviet coup, 




A few days after the repudiation, Western countries, represented by the US 
Ambassador M. Francis, expressed their protest and declared the repudiation decree null and 
void. This position was repeated regularly. In a letter dated, October 23, 1918
17, the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs threatened the future Russian government, which would be 
recognized “only if it takes over the obligations from its predecessor”. On May 30, 1919, the 
French Finance Minister reaffirmed that “We cannot accept as a right the repudiation of its 
debt by any country (…) otherwise no country in the world would be able to issue an 
international debt if a simple change in the government could annihilate the liabilities taken 
by the Nation”.  
 
During the two yeas following the revolution, the Bolsheviks faced a strong military 
opposition. They never fully recognized the former debt but kept an ambiguous position using 
debt recognition as one of their favorite peace negotiating tool. For example, on March 27, 
1918, an article published in Novaya Zizhn, Gorky’s journal, stressed the need to suppress the 
repudiation decree. In December 1918, Maxim Litvinov, interviewed by the London Daily 
Mirror, suggested exchanging economic concessions for a moratorium on Russia’s war debts 
(Thompson (1966)). On January 16, 1919, the Soviet government announced its desire to 
discuss the Russian foreign debt, a statement rendered public by President Wilson on January 
20, 1919. The following day, Soviets claimed they would repay part of the repudiated debt, 
and eventually on February 4, 1919, recognize their obligations. During the Paris Peace 
conferences, the Soviet government suggested that it was “ready to do much for the sake of 
peace, whether that meant paying at least part of the repudiated foreign debt or granting news 
concessions to foreign enterprises” (Macmillan (2003)). On February 14, 1919, L. Nadeau, 
representing the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, met Lenin, who suggested using part of 
the Russian natural resources to reimburse the bondholders. On November 19, 1919, 
Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, offered to pay Russia’s debt. But on March 28, 
1920, in a broadcasted speech, Krassine
18, the commissar for foreign trade, declared that the 
soviet government has suppressed the former debt and would never start talks regarding this 
issue. Contradictory statements were thus regularly made by the Bolshevik government. 
Nowadays it seems highly unlikely that the Bolshevik ever considered seriously repaying the 
Tsarist debt. However, at the time, these changing signals could impact the bond prices. 
                                                 
15 Financial Times, January 16, 1918. 
16 Journal Financier et Politique, February 27, 1918. 
17 ANPFVM 440-A-10. 
18 ANPFVM 440-A-18.   12
 
Contrasting with the Bolshevik position, the various counter-governments appearing in 
Russia recognized the debt in order to get an allied military support. For example, on 
November 21, 1918, Admiral Kolchak declared he would take over the debt burden, 
reaffirming his position on June 9, 1919. In France, Arthur Raffalovitch proposed a practical 
proposal to restart the debt service. However, after the Versailles Treaty, even the supporters 
of the Tsarist regime refused to recognize the whole-borrowed amount because Russia had 
not been invited to negotiate the war’s end. The various treaties were viewed as unfair to the 
White Russians who considered their country but partially responsible of its debt
19. 
Notwithstanding this position, on October 22, 1919, a British-American consortium issued a 




Russian Governments and the debt repudiation: Impact on the bond prices 
 
Bonds prices hardly reacted to statements coming from Russia on the day of their 
issuance. Following the first repudiation rumors and the decree proposal, the 1906 Russian 
bond price dropped from 56% to 50.75% in a few days. For January 13, 1918 the weekly 
return is equal to -8.89% whereas the daily return on February 8, 1918 (day of the publication 
of the official repudiation decree) is null suggesting that the repudiation impact had already 
been fully incorporated.  
 
The first statements inducing the feeling that the debt could be repaid have a clear 
impact on bond prices: both the debt recognition proposal issued in Novaya Zizhn on March 
27, 1918 and the Soviet proposal, in December 1918, to discuss the debt issue led to high 
weekly returns (respectively 3.19% and 9.17%). However, afterwards, the Bolsheviks 
supposedly changing opinions regarding the debt treatment have almost no more effect on the 
bond prices. This limited impact is confirmed by The Economist on February 15, 1919: 
“Russians were also rather stronger under the influence of the new attitude of the Soviets 
towards the Russian debt, rising by between 75 centimes and one franc”, reflecting investors’ 
disbelief of Soviet statements. 
 
The Allied countries’ reactions regarding the illegality of the debt repudiation hardly 
affected the bond prices. Two reasons can explain this fact. First, these statements were 
seldom linked with military operations. Second, and most likely, investors had anticipated 
them because repudiations represent such an extreme position, that obviously no government 
could support the Bolshevik view. The same holds probably also for the anti-Bolshevik 
governments’ position. Following Kolchak’s debt recognition, on November 21, 1918 bond 
prices increased with but 1.59% and when he reaffirmed this statement, in June 1919, the 
bond price declined, suggesting that the prices already incorporated the recognition in 
November 1918. Furthermore, the negative return tend to indicate that prices react to other 
but simultaneous events, such as White Armies military drawbacks. 
 
Statements regarding the Russian debt recognition have thus an overall surprisingly 
limited impact on bond prices. Even though the repudiation decree clearly influenced the 
investors’ expectations, it brought but a moderate price decrease when first issued. If a larger 
                                                 
19 Non-recognition concerned only the debt issued to support WWI’s military expenses. The repayment of the 
studied bond was never questioned as it had been issued before WWI. 
20 The Times, October 23, 1919.   13
window is examined, to take into account the repudiation rumors, this conclusion remains 
valid. Following the repudiation, the price declined but certainly not as extremely as 
theoretically expected. The Bolshevik proposal to reimburse the debt had only an impact 
when first stated. Afterwards as no concrete measures were taken, investors stopped believing 
the Soviets. Statements made on the Allied side or by the White Armies went almost 
unnoticed on the bond market.  
 
The creation of new countries and the secession of territories: historical 
presentation 
 
At the end of World War I several countries seceded from Russia
21, others acquired 
new territories. Referring to the Ottoman precedent, investors could hope to get at least part of 
their investment paid back by these countries. Poland declared its independence in 1918 and 
got Soviet recognition after the 1920-1921 Soviet-Polish war. In November 1918, Baltic 
States became independent
22 and, after a violent civil war, Finland achieved the same result
23. 
Most new countries’ boundaries became definitive by the Versailles Treaty, which took place 
on June 28, 1919.  
 
On January 22, 1918, a report from the Office National des Valeurs Mobilières warned 
that, if at the end of the war, some Russian regions became autonomous or left the Russian 
Empire, negotiations would be necessary to determine the responsibility of each newly 
created country regarding the Russian debt
24. A report
25 dated February 3, 1918, stressed that 
the secession of territories or the creation of new countries would make reimbursement more 
difficult for Western investors as reaching an agreement with many small countries would be 
more difficult than with just one large. Nonetheless, by helping the small countries to exist, 
their friendship could be gained for the future
26. On October 1918, the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs expressed his position regarding the country break-up stating that, in view of 
the jurisprudence; Russia was but responsible for part of its debt
27. Therefore, he would 
support the creation of an international organization to determine the amounts due by each 
country. Ironically enough, in the beginning of the 1920’s the Bolshevik government 
representing Russia declared that newly created countries had no obligation regarding the 
Tsarist debt.  
 
To our knowledge, a temporary Ukrainian “government” was the only one, in the 
1920’s, to recognize its responsibility for part of the Russian debt
28, probably with the hope to 
get British or French military support. The creation of an independent Ukraine fueled the 
investors’ hope to get at least partially, reimbursed. Indeed, on September 26, 1918, the 
Ukrainian “Council of Ministers” promised an advance on the Tsarist coupons for the bonds 
held in Ukrainian banks before November 3, 1918. In its September 29, 1918, issue, Finances 
                                                 
21 As for instance Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, Finland, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Dagestan or Georgia 
22 With a Bolshevik government up to October 1919 in Lithuania. 
23 These countries got Soviet recognition in 1920 by the Dorpat, Riga and Turku Treaties.  
24 “Note sur la création d’un comité français de protection des intérêts français en Russie”, Office National des 
Valeurs mobilières, 22/1/1918, ANPFVM 440-A-17. 
25 “La situation industrielle en Russie”, 3 février 1918, ANPFVM 440-A-14. 
26 A view shared by the French press, see for example La gazette du commerce et de l’industrie July 13, 1918. 
27 Letter from Stephen Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the president of the Office National des 
Valeurs mobilières, October 23, 1918, ANPFVM 440-A-10. 
28 Rumania would agree, in 1934, to repay part of the Akerman railway bonds which had helped develop the 
railway industry in Bessarabia, a province reattached to Rumania after WWI (Freymond (1995)).    14
et économies populaires reported this news under the title “The Tsarists bonds are 
recognized”
29. Strategically, Ukrainian rulers reaffirmed very often their intention to repay
30 
but the bondholders never received anything. This issue was settled at the end of 1918, when 
Ukraine came back under Soviet control.  
 
The creation of new countries and the secession of territories: Impact on the bond 
prices 
 
During the period under study, statements regarding the new countries recognition 
made either by French politicians or by the French press had almost no impact on the, 
reimbursement perception. Nevertheless, following the Ukrainian September 26, 1918, 
declaration the bond prices exhibited a sharp rise (with a 5.31% daily return). However, the 
latter cannot be attributed for sure to this news, as on the same day the WWI’s Allied final 
offensive begins. As a whole, news related to the creation of countries had minor effects on 
the bond prices. Two factors explain this: first, most of the countries were created after the 
studied period (or at its very end), second there were few changes in political positions thus 
few investors’ reactions. Notwithstanding, the possibility that a least one new country would 
assume part of the debt burden could partly explain why prices remained high up to end 1919. 
 




The two years following the October Revolution were, on the military point of view, 
extremely confused. Three main military forces fought the Soviets: Germany (as a 
continuation of WWI), White Russians and Allied troops. This section describes first the 
German operations, then the Allied interventions and lastly the White armies’ actions directed 
against Soviet troops. Appendices 3 and 4 summarize the main military events occurring 
during 1918 and 1919 as well as their expected and real impact on the bond prices. 
 
After the October events, revolutionary leaders expressed contradictory views 
regarding the war
32. Peace negotiations with Germany started nonetheless in December 1917 
with the Soviets pleading for a peace without territorial changes. According to Avenel (2001) 
the negotiations involved a first meeting on January 17, 1918, followed by a German 
ultimatum. In view of the Soviet refusal, a German offensive started a month later resulting in 
the invasion of a large part of Ukraine, Livonia and Estonia. On February 20, 1918, the 
Germans moved towards Reval, Petrograd, Moscow and Kiev, meeting little resistance, and 
occupy Hapsal and Minsk. On March 3, 1918, after these military drawbacks, the Soviet 
government signed the Brest Litovsk peace treaty leading to large territorial losses. 
 
In the Allies’ eyes, if the Bolsheviks were overthrown, Russia would again fight 
against Germany. Therefore, in the spring of 1918, British troops landed in Northern Russia. 
                                                 
29 On reconnaît les emprunts du Tsar. 
30 For example, in a letter, dated June 22, 1920, Earl Tyszkiewicz, president of the Ukrainian delegation 
recognizes Ukrainian responsibility for 30% of the former Russian debt.  
31 The following section is mainly based on Avenel (2001), Footman (1961), Gleichen (1988), Mawdsley (1997), 
Pipes (1990) and Salomoni (1997). 
32 Whereas some, as Lenin, claimed that their participation to the war should be stopped in order to consolidate 
the revolution, others like Bukharin believed that the war could lead to a world revolution. Trotsky was in favor 
of a “wait and see” attitude as he expected revolutions to start in Austria and Germany.   15
In Siberia, the Japanese army and the Czechoslovakian Legion
33 would fight the Bolsheviks. 
With the hope to get Allied support to create an independent Czech state after WWI, the 
Czech legion decided, on May 25, 1918, to side along with them. End May 1918, they 
invaded Vladivostok and on June 8, 1918 conquered Samara. On July 6, 1918 a Japanese 
occupation army, quickly backed by US troops, arrived in Siberia and secured Vladivostok on 
August 3, 1918. On July 16, 1918, French troops joined the Northern Russian Expeditionary 
Force at Murmansk and strengthened, on September 16, 1918 their position near Archangel. 
A few days later, on September 20, 1918 the Czech legion was defeated on the Volga. 
 
After WWI, the French and British governments kept troops in Russia recognized the 
White general Denikin’s authority and send additional men to support him. As stated by 
Churchill
34, “by the end of 1918 there were over 180 000 foreign troops on Russian soil and 
several White Russian armies receiving Allied money and Allied guns”. On December 17, 
1918, French troops landed in Odessa. However, on March 17, 1919, the Allies were forced to 
evacuate Odessa, and in view of the difficulties experienced on both the Northern and the 
Southern fronts, the French and British governments decided on March 21, 1919, to withdraw 
their forces from Russia. Eventually, on April 8, 1919, Bolsheviks expelled the last remaining 
French troops from Odessa. On September 27, 1919, Allied troops left Archangel. 
 
Foreign interventions represented but a part of the military offensives against the 
Soviets. Very soon Russian opposition to the Soviets emerged. As underlined by Mawdsley 
(1997), “The early centers of resistance were (…) places with a particular national or 
territorial identity or with conservative characteristics where the internal seizure of Soviet 





In Southern Russia, a few days after the October revolution, the Russian Volunteer 
Army was created. Even though all the parties involved in this creation were opposed to the 
Soviets, they had different goals ranging from the wish to recreate the Russian Empire as 
before WWI or the Cossacks hope to get a broad autonomy in a federated Russia. During the 
1917-1918 winter, the Bolsheviks benefited from these discrepancies and accumulated 
military successes and on February 11, 1918, they conquered Rostov. From March to April, 
the White Armies retake the lost territories. According to Gleichen (1988), strong rumours of 
a counter-revolution in Russia reached Western Europe on April 30, 1918. Anti-Bolshevik 
troops conquered Sirzan on June 18, 1918, Ufa on July 1, 1918 and Ekatherinburg on July 20, 
1918. Three days before, the Bolsheviks had executed the Tsar Nicholas II and his family.  
 
After his power seizure in Omsk (Siberia), on November 18, 1918 Admiral Kolchak 
led the White fighting forces. In order to strengthen his power, he used repressive methods, 
which soon alienated the population’s support. On December 24, 1918, his army conquered 
Perm, an operation, which according to Avenel (2001), brought him a large prestige among 
the French and British governments. Following this event, they supported him actively. On 
February 6, 1919, General Wrangel defeated the Red Army in a fight for the Caucasian 
regions, and eight days later General Denikin started a major offensive in the South.  
 
                                                 
33 This legion was composed of Czechs prisoner who had refused to fight for the Austro-Hungary Empire. 
34 Quoted in Macmillan (2003). 
35 First under Kaledin, then under Denikin and eventually under Wrangel command. 
36 With as main military actors the Czech legion, Allied forces, and Kolchak’s troops.   16
On March 13, 1919, Kolchak began a general attack in Siberia but encountered only 
short-lived successes. Facing a Bolshevik counter-offensive, he evacuated Samara in April 
1919. End April 1919, Denikin and Kolchak resumed with victory. On May 9, 1919, Kolchak 
stopped the Red Army at the battle of Velikoniazheskaïa. On May 13, 1919 the Western press 
describes the successful operations led by General Denikin in Southern Russia. On May 26, 
1919 Denikin recognizes Kolchak’s authority, as the latter got formal support from the Allies. 
However, whereas Denikin conquered Tsaritsyn
37 on June 16, 1919, and Kharkov on June 25, 
1919, Kolchak is defeated on June 9, 1919. On July 3, Denikin moved to attack Moscow but 
was defeated frst, on September 27, then on October 20, 1919. Meanwhile, his troops had 
reached Orel on October 14, 1919. On November 14, 1919 Omsk is taken over by the 
Bolsheviks and a month later, on December 24, 1919 an Anti-Kolchak revolt burst in Irkutsk 
where Kolchak is executed two months later.  
 
The last major 1919 offensive emerged from the Baltic States. From Estonia, the 
White general Yudenich launched an attack on Petrograd
38 but his army was eventually 
defeated on November 14, 1919. 
 
The Civil War, the German and the Allied actions in Russia: Impact on the bond 
prices 
 
While precise events seldom had a direct impact, the bond prices exhibit an overall 
trend consistent with the White armies’ drawbacks or victories. For example, according to 
Salomoni (1997), May 1918 can be viewed as the first military attack against the Bolsheviks 
while August coincided with the climax of the Volga Army’s action. In concordance with 
this, from May to August 1918 the prices exhibited an upward trend. From December 1918 to 
April 1919 the market was bearish, with however a short-lived positive effect in February. 
This price decline reflected the overall good position and victories experienced by the Red 
Army. Bond prices rose from May to July 1919, declined shortly in September 1919, 
increased sharply in October 1919 and fell afterwards. These reactions followed the White 
and Allied Armies’ fortune: defeats at the begin of 1919, victories in Southern Russia and 
Siberia from April to begin July, then drawbacks in August and September followed by an 
almost victorious offensive in October 1919 with Yudenich Army fighting in Petrograd’s 
suburbs and Denikin reaching Orel. The contemporaneous economic press confirms this view. 
During May 1919, The Economist attributed “the appreciable improvement in Russian (…) on 
the news of the fresh successes by Anti-Bolshevik troops
39” and “the improved news from 
Russia, and the belief that Bolshevism is on the verge to collapse, has brought about 
improvement in Russian securities
40”. In September the same year, heavy falls that occurred 
in Russian Government, Municipal and Railway issues were attributed to the announcement 
that British Forces were withdrawing from North Russia
41. In its November 1, 1919 issue, The 
Economist believed that “Russian government stocks have shown appreciable rises on the 
strength of optimistic reports from the Petrograd front in regard to the prospects of 
Yudenich’s forces”. A week later however, Russian securities were “heavier owing to the 
stoppage of Yudenich’s offensive
42”. The importance of the civil war on the Russian section 
                                                 
37 Later named Stalingrad, nowadays Volgograd. 
38 Formerly Saint Petersburg later named Leningrad, nowadays Saint Petersburg. 
39 The Economist, May 3, 1919. 
40 The Economist, May 10, 1919. 
41 The Economist, September 20, 1919. 
42 The Economist, November 8, 1919.   17
is further assessed by the fact that high volume and periods of renewed activity usually match 
White military successes. 
 
The bond prices hardly reacted immediately to all the major battles held on Russian 
soil. Several factors explain this result. Even nowadays, it is hard to draw a clear picture of all 
protagonists’ fate during the Russian civil war. At the time interpreting war news was even 
harder. Furthermore, a reaction can arise only if the news properly reached France, an 
element, which may be questioned. As stated by Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister: 
“We were in fact never dealing with ascertained or perhaps, even ascertainable facts. Russia 
was a jungle in which no one could say what was within a few yards of him
43” Eventually, 
news considered unimportant today may have been interpreted as major at the time. In order 
to take this element into account, the study refers often to the contemporaneous press and to 
Gleichen (1988), which gives a contemporary report of war news. 
 
Up to the end of WWI, six military events seem related to an extreme daily return: the 
peace negotiations between German and Soviets on January 17, 1918 (-3.77%), the adoption 
of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by the German Reichstag (-5.10%), the counter revolution rumors 
of April 30, 1918 (8.70%), the proclamation of the Siberian Government Council, on July 23, 
1918 (3.60%), the arrival of French troops in Northern Russia, on July 26, 1918 (3.42%) and 
the Czech Legion defeat on the Volga on September, 20, 1918 (-3.14%). Due to a possible 
time lag, news can impact bond prices later. After the Armistice, two extreme daily returns 
can be linked to military events, the several victorious offensive from end April 1919 and 
White general Denikin’s successes in Southern Russia on May 13, 1919. A third one, is 
related to the political recognition of Kolchak by France, Great-Britain, Italy and the United 
States on June 12, 1919. 
 
If one takes into account a 3 days time lag for news to reach France, results remain 
almost the same. Up to July 1919 and with the exception of events happening during July 
1918, if news had an impact on the three days lagged returns they were also reflected on the 
daily returns. After July 1919, it seems that news took more time to reach Paris. The 
occupation of Perm (July 1, 1919), Denikin’s advance to Orel (October 14, 1919) and the 
Anti-Kolchak revolt in Irkutsk (December 24, 1919), respectively led to a –5.69%, 7.96% and 
–5.94% 3 days lagged return. The 7 days lagged returns do not allow determining additional 
events, exception made for July 1918. For this specific month, extreme returns were observed 
for July 16-17, 21, 23, 25 and 26 1918.  
 
Results must been taken with caution as some of them are very counterintuitive. For 
example, bond prices exhibited a puzzling strong positive reaction following the death of the 
Tsar Nicholas II
44. Another surprising result is observed on December 24, 1918. The very 
negative daily return (-5.08%) coincides with Perms’ conquest by Kolchak, an event that this 
could hardly be perceived as a bad omen for the future. Furthermore, supposedly important 
events such as the Czech revolt on May 25, 1918, the Allied intervention in Vladivostok on 
August 3, 1918 or Kazan’s conquest on August 6, 1918 had almost no impact. Several 
elements can explain this. First, reactions may be unobservable because simultaneous 
important events took place on the Western front. This explanation fits well for the execution 
                                                 
43 Quoted by Macmillan (2003). 
44 These suggests that for French bondholders, the Tsar had a minor role regarding the debt repayment, that his 
death was an act of despair or that other events cancelled the Tsar death’s effect. The three days and one week 
extremely high positive returns favor the latest explanation.   18
of Tsar Nicholas II and the absence of reaction following the Czech revolt
45. Microstructure 
effects may also play a role, the Tsar death and Kolchak victory in Perm happened while the 
Russian section was very quiet. Eventually, some unexpected results remain unexplained. 
Thus, even for the “identified” events a doubt remains as to the accurateness of the suggested 
explanation.  
 
As a conclusion, identifying the impact of precise events is in the Russian case 
extremely hard as news was delayed and many events happened simultaneously. Nonetheless, 
during 1918, the three kinds of news (i.e. related to repudiation, civil war and the numerous 
secessions) played at some point an important role. However, some seemingly important 
events had no impact on the bond prices. This suggests that, other potentially more important 
news interfered. For 1919, only military events were clearly reflected in the bond prices. They 
explain most of the extreme price changes for that year and therefore offer the most likely 
explanation to the puzzle. As a whole, amongst events happening in Russia, news from the 
civil war was the most important.  
 
4. … or does the explanation lie abroad? 
 
The analyzed bonds were traded from the Paris Stock Exchange. Thus, news 
threatening France’s future could have an impact on all traded securities. Indeed, if the 
German were to take over Paris, the bondholders would probably need cash if they wanted to 
leave an occupied city. Thus, any news changing the anticipations regarding the capital city’s 
fate was included in the bond prices. Second, regarding the Russian bonds themselves if the 
holders were expecting France to act as a lender of last resort then a German victory would be 
catastrophic. As France would then probably have to pay reparations, its government would 
revise its position regarding the Russian bonds. This section describes first the different 
military operations and peace negotiations held on French soil, then the French government’s 
attitude towards the repudiated debt and ends with the description of the bondholders’ 
associations actions. The impact of these elements on the bond prices is subsequently 
analyzed.  
 
Graph 4 puts the bond price evolution during 1918 in perspective with the events, happening 
out of Russia, which had the main impact on the bonds. 
                                                 
45 The Tsar’s death coincided with very successful French offensives on the Western front and the news of the 
third German spring offensive on May, 27, 1918 probably offset any positive reaction to the Czech revolt.   19
 
GRAPH 4: Bond price evolution and most influential events happening abroad in 1918 
 























































































































































































































































































































World War I and its aftermath: historical presentation 
 
On March 21, 1918 the German troops started a major offensive on the Western front. 
A few days later, the French and British appointed Marshal Foch as commander of the Anglo-
French Army. For the first time, since the beginning of WWI, one person became responsible 
of both armies. On March 30, 1918, the German progression was stopped. It was followed by 
a period, considered by Duroselle (1994) as WWI’s turning point (April to July 1918). On 
April 9, 1918 and May 27, 1918 two major German offensives were launched. As a 
consequence, an important territorial loss for the French allowed the German troops to bring 
the war at less than 60 km from Paris. On June 9, 1918 the fourth German spring offensive 
started. The Allied resisted and on July 15, 1919, Foch successfully counter-attacked. On 
September 26, 1918 the Franco-American troops engaged in what would become the final 
Allied offensive. On October 4, 1918, Germany asked for an armistice; preliminary 
discussions were held in Rethondes on November 8, 1918. The armistice itself was signed on 
November 11, 1918, and the war settlement negotiated at the Paris Peace conference in 
January 1919. According to Macmillan (2003), while US President Wilson hoped to reshape 
Europe by giving to the populations the right for auto-determination, Clemenceau, the French 
Prime Minister, considered the conference as an opportunity to “make Germany pay”. 
 
Due to the civil war raging in the country, no official delegation represented Russia in 
Paris. This absence created major difficulties as many new countries’ boundaries were shared 
with the former Empire. On January 21, 1919, and despite a strong French opposition, 
President Wilson suggested meeting with a Soviet representative. This suggestion proved 
unsuccessful. Article 116 of the future Versailles Treaty, adopted by the council of Four
46, on 
May 3, 1919, provided three things: “first, Germany was required to recognise the 
independence of all territories that had been part of the pre-war Russian Empire; second, the 
Brest Litovsk Treaty and all related and associated treaties were abrogated; third, the Allied 
and associated powers reserved Russia’s right to obtain reparations from Germany” 
(Thompson (1966)). The last part of article 116 thus opened the way for reparations if the 
former Russian government was restored. On June 28, 1919, German representatives signed 
the Versailles Treaty, thus putting an end on WWI.  
 
World War I and its aftermath: Impact on bond prices 
 
The bond prices clearly reacted to WWI events taking place on French soil. Some 
extreme returns were due to the first German spring offensive (March 21 and 23, 1918), the 
September 25, 1918 surprise attack and the beginning of the final Franco-American offensive 
on September 26, 1918. However, some important events were not reflected. For instance, on 
the day of the third German spring offensive, the bond exhibit a negative but moderate return 
(-1.01%), while in view of the military implications of this attack, a stronger decline could 
have been expected
47. Globally, the bond price followed a trend related to war events 
suggesting a progressive integration of the news. For example, from June 3, 1918 till August 
2, 1918, the Russian bond prices exhibited an upward trend, which is linked to the ever-
                                                 
46 In the last week of March 1919, a Council of Four was created in order to settle the major questions without 
unwished interferences. Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, 
Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, and the US President Wilson were the members of this council. 
47 This could be due to the fact that on almost the same date, the Czech Legion began its Anti-Bolshevik crusade.   21
increasing anticipated arrival of American troops on French soil and to the July French 
victory. 
 
Peace negotiations also played a role in the bond evaluation. The Rethondes meeting 
and the integration of Article 116 in the Versailles Treaty, led to extreme returns. The impact 
of the latter must be stressed. Indeed, it opened the way for Russians to use German wealth to 
repay part of the debt. It seems that, at the time, the German alternative was seriously 
considered. The financial press
48 stressed the importance of the Paris peace negotiations on 
the Russian section of the London Stock Exchange: “Russians were in some speculative 
favour (…) owing to the impression that the Peace conference will make an early start upon 
the re-settlement of affairs in Russia”, also holding for the Paris bourse: “the Russian funds 
have been uncertain, owing to the attitude which is to be adopted by the Peace conference as 
to the Russian problem”
49. 
 
The national reactions: historical presentation  
 
At WWI’s outbreak, France and Great-Britain agreed to open a credit line for Russia 
to fulfill its obligations regarding the coupons payment (Comité des représentants des banques 
russes à Paris (1921)). Thus, from 1914 to 1917, French investors got used to see France 
advance the funds for the Russian coupon payments, a signal that France could continue to 
support Russian securities. The wide diffusion of Russian securities among the French public 
and the French government involvement in the flotation of Russian securities
50 strengthened 
this signal. If Russia were to experience financial difficulties, the French government would 
find a solution to protect its national bondholders. An historical precedent strengthened this 
feeling. During the XIXth century, France had reimbursed Mexican bonds because the 
government felt it was responsible for their flotation on the Paris Stock Exchange. Logically, 
in the Russian case, French investors expected the same outcome.  
 
As rumors regarding the repudiation gained in intensity, the French government 
guaranteed the payment of the January 1918 coupon
51. It stressed, however, that this payment 
should not be interpreted as debt recognition, a statement not credible to many investors. On 
January 31, 1918, M. Klotz, the French Finance Minister, declared that the government would 
pay the February coupons
52. Again, he insisted on the measures’ temporary nature, as 
discussions were held in order to achieve a common allied policy. Meanwhile, many voices 
claimed that France had a “moral duty” regarding the reimbursement
53. Besides the national 
turmoil created by the repudiation, the French government had, up to the end of WWI, an 
incentive to fulfill Russia’s obligations to keep its financial influence in Russia. 
 
Officially, the coupons payments were made to support an allied country facing 
momentary internal problems. Thus, as a result of the Brest Litovsk Treaty, France stopped 
servicing the Russian debt as it refused to help a country which had signed a separate peace 
                                                 
48 The Economist, February 1, 1919. 
49 The Economist, March 1, 1919. 
50 According to the 1913 new stock exchange regulation regarding, new admissions were subject to the sole 
authority of the French finance minister: a measure passed in order to let the French government regulate the 
Russian securities and exchange their admission against military support (Girault (1974)). Furthermore, before 
WWI, the French government strongly recommended that banks and businessmen financially support their Ally. 
51 Le Rentier December 27, 1917. 
52 Quoted in Le Rentier, February 27, 1918. 
53 Association Nationale des Porteurs Français de valeurs mobilières (1921).   22
with Germany
54. In reaction, part of the French financial press exhorted the investors to firmly 
protest
55. During August, many believed that the French parliament would change its decision 
and pay the second semester coupons
56. On September 19, 1918 the government passed a law 
allowing French investors to subscribe up to 50% of the new French Liberation loan by 
paying with the Russian coupons due from April to December 1918
57. This coupon exchange 
was the last action undertaken by the French government. Notwithstanding, as late as May 
30
th 1919, in a speech at the Senate, the French Finance Minister suggested to reiterate the 
September 1918 operation; a proposal eventually rejected by the rest of the government. 
 
French bondholders did not rely solely on their government. Very quickly, numerous 
bondholders’ associations were created. On August 5, 1918 a Commission générale pour la 
protection des intérêts français en Russie was born, followed on September 28, 1918 by the 
Comité de Défense des porteurs de Fonds d’Etat russes, de valeurs garanties par l’Etat russe 
et d’emprunts municipaux, and by the Comité de Défense des porteurs français de valeurs 
industrielles et bancaires russes on April 5, 1919. In the meantime, unscrupulous individuals 
set up fake associations to steel money from credulous investors. End august 1918, and 
following several scandals, financial journals warned investors. The official associations’ 
action consisted mainly in collecting relevant information and lobbying in order to get 
reimbursed by the French government
58. Eventually, bondholders hoped, if lobbying proved 
unsuccessful, to gain something when Russia would come back on the French market. The 
threat of no access to foreign capital markets and a boycott of Russian securities were 
seriously considered. 
 
Abroad, national reactions differed widely. As a consequence of the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty, the Soviets recognized the bonds held by German nationals
59. An additional 
convention dated August 27, 1918 guaranteed the transfer of gold, for the payment of the 
coupons and the amortized bonds on October 14, 1918. In September 1918, the Austrian 
government tried unsuccessfully to obtain the same agreement
60. In view of the economic 
crises created by the suspension of the coupon service, most countries proposed at least partial 
settlements. The Italian, British and US governments exchanged Russian bonds with, 
respectively, Italian state bonds (for approximately 50% of par value), British and American 
Treasury Bills. The best outcome remained for the Japanese, who suffered no losses as their 
government bought back the Russian bonds held by its nationals (Freymond (1995). 
 
                                                 
54 On January 27, 1918, the British government had agreed, to give British 12 years bonds in exchange of 
Russian Treasury Bills amounting at the time 10 000 000£. 
55 Le Rentier, February 27, 1918 and May 27, 1918. 
56 Le Rentier, August 27, 1918. 
57 This idea was already mentioned in the September 14, 1918 issue of the Revue des Valeurs Russes. At the 
time, it competed with another proposition: a general buyback of the Russian securities by the French 
government, which as sole remaining bondholder, would then have to convince the Soviet to repay. The total 
amount subscribed through this way reached 265 millions (Le Rentier, June 17, 1919).  
58 ANPFVM 440-A-10. 
59 In view of this, the French government feared that its citizens would sell their industrial securities at a low 
price to Germans. In a letter to M. Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs dated May 10
th 1918, the French 
ambassador in Sweden, M. Thiébaut, described this practice. ANPFVM 440A-10-24.  
60 Messager de Paris, September 12, 1918.   23
The national reactions: impact on bond prices 
 
In Paris, extreme returns followed from the actions undertaken by the British and 
French governments to service the Russian debt during January 1918. Depending on the 
country, the same bonds exhibited different prices. Expectations regarding the home 
government’s attitude played a major role but the creation of bondholders association had a 
minor impact.  
 
In January 1918, the British government took “protective measures with Russian 
Treasury and commercial paper” which according to the British press
61 “served to emphasize 
the feeling of mistrust (…) Consequently Russian bonds were again quoted substantially 
lower”. This phenomenon was not observed in France. Indeed, during the days following the 
bond prices continued to drop on the London Stock exchange whereas they recovered in 
Paris. The Financial Times
62 stressed the importance of “the alleged confiscatory policy 
adopted by the Bolsheviks in regard to British owned mines (…) which accentuated the 
feeling of distrust entertained by holders of Russian securities”. On the Paris Stock Exchange, 
the bond prices rose strongly end January 1918 as both France and Great-Britain guaranteed 
the January coupon. On March 13, 1918, in London, the Russian bonds price increased. 
According to the Financial Times, they were favorably influenced by the government’s 
announcement that the coupons due on March 1, on the 5% loan of 1822 were being paid or 
“by consideration of the advantage likely to accrue from the formation of the powerful 
committee of issuing bourses”. The following day, the Russian bonds traded in Paris also 
exhibited an upward trend. French investors probably considered that their government would 
follow the British measures, as suggested in a note dated March 15, 1918
63. End March 1918, 
the London Stock Exchange reacted to the “Allied disclaimer of responsibility for any further 
provision of funds to meet coupon payment”
64. The price drop experienced in London was not 
reflected on the Paris Bourse and after January 1918, national governments’ attitudes did not 
induce extreme returns. The price declined when the Soviets agreed to transfer gold to pay the 
German bondholders.  
 
During 1919, the French government made few statements regarding the debt but its 
price remained relatively high. This is perhaps a consequence of example of the so-called 
peso problem hypothesis
65. Investors believed in, and hoped, to see an event happen, which in 
fact never materialized and is thus unobservable. This expected event need not be highly 
unlikely. In fact, investors made rational expectations and considered the probability and the 
potential impact of the event. In the Russian case, investors probably hoped a takeover of the 
debt by the French government; an element that never happened. This is probably the most 
likely explanation for the first puzzle, namely the persistent relatively high value of bonds up 
to end 1919. Of course, part of the puzzle itself could be, for some low activity periods, an 
illusion due to a microstructure effect.   
 
World War I events were clearly reflected on the bond prices, whereas the 
bondholders’ actions had but a very minor impact. The French and British involvement 
                                                 
61 Financial Times, January 19, 1918. 
62 Financial Times, January 23, 1918. 
63 “Comment sauver le revenu français à l’étranger?” Note de M. Aulagnon, 15/03/1918, ANPFVM 440-A-14. 
64 Financial Times, April 2, 1918. 
65 Goetzmann and Jorion (1999)) have argued that the high risk premium of stock returns may be explained by 
the fact that investors expected the stock market to experience a major event (closure…) that never happened.   24
regarding the bond repayment played a direct major role in January 1918 but not anymore 
afterwards. For 1919, only one event, the inclusion of Article 116 in the Versailles Treaty, 




  The SRP consists of two main issues: first, the limited price decline following the 
repudiation announcement, second, the relatively high price observed for the two following 
years. The paper analyzes to which events bond prices react. Up to WW1’s end, news from 
the French front explained an important part of major value changes. Afterwards, news from 
the Russian civil war had the most dramatic impact. Statements regarding the repudiation, 
debt recognition by newly created countries, the French government’s attitude towards 
reimbursement and bondholders’ actions played also a role, although less preeminent. 
Furthermore, microstructure effects probably also allow understanding part of the puzzle’s 
stylized facts. 
 
  The Soviet repudiation problematic gives an insight on actual issues regarding 
sovereign debts. The analysis emphasizes the importance of statements’ credibility. Bond 
prices reacted to the Soviets’ first proposals to recognize the debt. However as no concrete 
actions backed these allegations, investors stopped trusting the Soviet announcements. 
Furthermore, the paper confirms the results of previous studies showing the impact of war 
events on national bond prices. It further builds on these results. Indeed, it shows that in some 
cases military events concerning the country where the bonds are traded have a bigger impact 
than war events taking place in the issuing country. This suggests that bond prices can highly 
differ depending on the stock exchange’s location. Another element strengthens this 
argument: depending on the stock exchange, national governments took very different 
measures regarding the same debt. Whereas Japanese got fully repaid, French bondholders 
received a minimal payment from their government.  
 
Two important particularities need to be stressed here: first, as serial numbers were 
attached to a specific stock exchange, there was no geographic arbitrage opportunity between 
bourses; second these reimbursements were most of time made for citizens of the reimbursing 
country only. Thus, not only the location of the stock exchange played a role but the 
investors’ nationality. The Soviet case is a good example of creditors’ “grab race”, with 
German bondholders being the only ones fully reimbursed. The “grab race” issue remains 
and, nowadays, most workout proposals for sovereign debtors suggest avoiding creditors 
acting on their own in order to avoid free-riding
 66.  
 
Recently, Eichengreen and Portes (1995) have recommended recreating
67 
bondholders’ representative committees which would “minimize uncertainty about the locus 
of authority in negotiations”. Even though the analysis shows that the creation of 
bondholders’ associations is not reflected on bond prices, their suggestion is appealing. The 
absence of reaction in the Russian case does by no mean imply that bondholders’ committees 
were useless. As a matter of fact, the lobbying action of l’Association française des porteurs 
                                                 
66  See for example Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002). Settlements reached in 
the framework of the Paris Club require an equitable debt sharing and a consensus.  
67 Powerful during from the end of the XIXth century to the interwar period, bondholders’ committees lost much 
of their influence after WWII.   25
de valeurs mobilières probably induced the payment of the first Russian coupons by the 
French government. Thus, results obtained in the Russian case also have implications for 
today’s policy towards sovereign debts. Nowadays, supranational organizations such as the 
IMF or the World Bank help settling sovereign debt defaults. Nonetheless, there is still no 
consensus on the measures to be taken. In this respect, financial history provides a valuable 
contribution to the debate as it allows, among others, former policies’ impact.  
 
Further research could be conducted to determine to which extent the risk of country 
break-up is integrated in bond prices. In this respect, the former Yugoslavian debt could 
provide an interesting case. Another extension of this paper could compare the Russian bond 
price evolution on basis of a benchmark, such as a French national bond in order to determine 
whether French military events affected the market as a whole. Eventually, the importance of 
the trade location could be tested by analyzing the price differentials between Russian bonds 
traded in Paris and London. This price differential would reflect investors’ perception of their 
government’s willingness to support the defaulting country and possibly their expected 
bargaining power to reach a settlement. Modern sovereign debts issued by countries perceived 
as very risky, could be influenced by the place were they are traded. Thus, even though the 
IMF aims at securing global settlement in case of default, international relations may play an 
important role with regard to the financial support given by a specific country. In this 
framework, the credibility of the potential retaliations (economic as well as armed 
interventions) must be stressed. 
 
In a sense, the Soviet repudiation offers a unique example of a multidimensional peso 
problem, for which several events of different nature had at some point a non-negligible 
likelihood to become reality. These positive events were numerous and included: the Soviet 
overthrow, a Soviet withdrawal of the repudiation decree, a foreign partial reimbursement (by 
a newly created country for example) or a reimbursement by the French authorities. Investors’ 
rationality should thus not be questioned: prices integrated the fact that ex ante it was 
reasonable to assume that at least one of these events would happen. Notably, the French 
payment of the January coupon raised the question of what would have happened had the 
Bolsheviks not signed the Brest Litovsk Treaty.  
 
  Historians have the opportunity to study a specific problem in a large time 
window. In fact, if one extended the analysis up to today, one of these expected events 
eventually took place. Indeed, as a consequence of WWII, the number of repudiated bonds 
increased dramatically as many countries fell under the Soviet sphere of influence and 
mimicked the Soviet position. Russian bonds remained traded on the Paris stock exchange up 
to the 1990’s with, however, an almost insignificant volume of transactions. Nonetheless, 
hope never completely disappeared. Freymond (1995) describes punctual period of fever on 
the Russian section of the Paris Stock Exchange. In 1954, the price of a 4.5% Russian bond 
issued in 1909 got multiplied by 60 as an important Franco-Soviet agreement was signed. In 
1993, the French government settled part of the issue with the Russia, which agreed to 
partially reimburse French bondholders. Noteworthy, British bondholders had reached the 
same outcome 7 years before, an element confirming the major role of international relations.   26
APPENDIX 1: Extreme returns







April 30, 1918  8,70%  Russia: counter-revolution rumors  R 
September 25, 1918  -7,00% Surprise German attack   W 
April 25, 1919  6,53%  Denikin and Kolchak victories  R 
May 3, 1919  5,36%  Article 116 of Versailles Treaty adopted by the council of Four  W 
May 13, 1919  5,36%  Military successes for General Denikin   R 
September 27, 1918  5,31%  Final Allied offensive of the war  
Ukrainian debt recognition 
W 
S 
March 23, 1918  -5,10% Russian and Romanian treaties adopted by Reichstag 
German troops reach line of Somme 
R 
W 
December 24, 1918  -5,08% Bolsheviks advance in Estonia reported on December 26, 1918*
71 R 
November 24, 1919  4,98%     
February 1, 1918  4,55%  Ukraine recognition by the central powers 
France will pay the February coupons 
S 
B 
October 16, 1919  4,27%  Denikin troops reach Orel (320 km from Moscow) on October 14, 
1919* 
R 
January 29, 1918  4,27%     
July 29, 1918  4,13%     
December 26, 1919  -4,04% Anti-Kolchak revolt in Irkutsk on December 24, 1919*  R 
January 17, 1918  -3,77% Peace negotiations between German and Soviets  R 
January 16, 1918  -3,64% Bolsheviks Superior Council for National goods adopts the 
repudiation decree on January 14, 1918* 
S 
June 12, 1919  3,63%  Acknowledgment of France, Great-Britain, Italy and the USA to  R 
                                                 
68 Extreme returns exceed the mean + twice the standard deviation.  
69 Suggested explanation that do not happen on the day itself are marked with a * 
70 Events are sorted according to their nature, B (bondholders actions), R (Military events in Russia), S (Statements regarding the debt), W (Military events linked to WWI 
in France).  
71 The Stock Exchange being closed from December 24 to 30, it makes sense to consider an event happening after the extreme return date.    27
extend support to Kolchak 
July 23, 1918  3,60%  Proclamation of Siberian Government Council  S 
October 15, 1919  3,54%  Denikin troops reach Orel* (320 km from Moscow) on October 14, 
1919. 
R 
November 25, 1919  -3,45%    
July 26, 1918  3,42%  French troops join the Northern Russian Expeditionary Force at 
Murmansk 
R 
May 5, 1919  3,39%     
July 2, 1919  -3,28%    
July 31, 1918  3,17%     
September 17, 1918  3,16%     
December 29, 1919  -3,16% Anti-Kolchak revolt in Irkutsk on December 24, 1919*  R 
March 17, 1919  -3,14% French and Allies evacuating Odessa  R 
September 20, 1918  -3,14% Set-back of Czecho-Slovaks on the Volga  R 
October 22, 1919  -3,07%    
 
   28
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January 13, 1918  Bolsheviks Superior Council for National goods issues a project 
of repudiation decree 
Bad 0,54%  -4,85%  -8,89% 
January 14, 1918  Bolsheviks Superior Council for National goods adopts the 
repudiation decree 
Bad 0,54%  -4,85%  -8,89% 
January, 21 1918  Soviet Central Committee repudiates the Tsarist debt  Bad  0,00% -1,48% 0,99% 
February 8, 1918  “Pravda” publishes the Soviet Official repudiation decree  Bad  0,00%  -1,36%  -2,73% 
February 13, 1918  Ambassador delegation and Western democracies declare 
repudiation null and void 
Good 0,93%  -0,65%  0,28% 
March 27, 1918  Debt recognition proposal in Novaya Zizhn    Good  0,53% 1,60% 3,19% 
July 6,1918  Bolsheviks propose changes in the repudiation decree  Good  0,97%  0,97%  0,97% 
September 26, 1918  The Ukrainian Council of Ministers recognizes the debt and 
makes provisions for coupons 
Good 5,31%  5,31%  11,50% 
October 1918  Ufa and Omsk government recognize the debt  Good  NA  NA  NA 
End of WWI  White Russian in Paris declare that Russia is only responsible 
for part of its debt  
Good NA NA NA 
November 21, 1918  Admiral Kolchak recognizes the debt  Good  1,59%  0,00%  1,59% 
December 23, 1918  Soviet representative, Litvinov, ready to grant economic 
concessions against a war debt moratorium 
?  -1,26% -6,28% -6,28% 
January 14-16, 1919 
 
January 20, 1919 
British-Soviet meeting in Stockholm, Soviet government ready 
to compromise on Russia’s foreign debt 













January 21, 1919   Soviet government ready to repay part of repudiated debts  Good  1,63%  0,65%  -2,85% 
February 4, 1919  Soviet government ready to recognize repudiated debts  Good  -0,42%  2,52%  -0,84% 
                                                 
72 Events have been chosen with regard to the bond prices problematic. Statements dealing with other financial issues (banking problem for example) have thus been 
omitted. Appendix 1 is thus not exhaustive.  
73 If the stock exchange was closed on the announcement day, we take into account the daily return from the next opened day.   29
February 14, 1919  L. Nadeau, the French Foreign Affairs representative meets 
Lenin 
Good  0,86% 1,72% 0,00% 
June 4, 1919 
Reaching Paris on 
June 11, 1919  










November 19, 1919  Chicherin offers to pay Russia’s debts  Good  0,00%  -1,34%  -1,61%   30
APPENDIX 3: Main military events in Russia during 1918
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January 17, 1918  Peace negotiations between Soviets and German  Bad  -3,77% -4,25%  -5,66% 
February 1, 1918  Central Powers recognize Ukraine Republic as independent state  ?  4,55%  -0,42%  0,42% 
February, 11, 1918  Fall of Rostov
75 Bad  -0,46% -2,12%  -1,84% 
February, 20, 1918  German armies occupy Hapsal and Minsk  Bad  -0,47% -3,26%  -5,30% 
March 3, 1918  Brest-Litovsk Treaty.  Bad  -0,50% -3,53%  -4,72% 
March 23, 1918  Russian and Romanian treaties adopted by Reichstag  Bad  -5,10% -4,29%  -2,55% 
April 22, 1918  Transcaucasian federation becomes independent  ?  -0,44% -1,10%  1,10% 
April, 30, 1918  Russia: counter-revolution rumors   Good  8,70%  8,70%  10,87% 
May 3, 1918  German-Finn victory against Red Guard in south-west Finland.  ?  2,00%  2,00%  0,00% 
May 25, 1918  Czech Legion revolt  Good  0,00%  -1,01%  -5,53% 
May 26, 1918  Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan become independent  ?  -1,01% -2,51%  -5,53% 
June 8, 1918  Czech Legion conquers Samara  Good  1,56%  -1,04%  -1,04% 
June 18, 1918  Sirzan conquered  Good  0,00%  0,52%  1,05% 
July 1, 1918  Ufa conquered  Good  0,50%  2,01%  3,52% 
July 6, 1918  US intervention in Siberia  Good  0,97%  0,97%  0,97% 
July 16-17, 1918   Tsar Nicholas II and family executed  Bad  1,44%  4,31%  10,05% 
July 21, 1918  New-York Times publishes the Tsar’s death  Bad  1,83%  5,50%  11,01% 
July 23, 1918  Proclamation of Siberian Government Council   Good  3,60%  5,41%  13,51% 
July 25, 1918  Ekatherinburg conquered  Good  1,74%  5,22%  13,04% 
July 26, 1918  French troops join the Northern Russian Expeditionary Force at 
Murmansk.  
Good 3,42% 3,42% 11,11% 
August 3, 1918  Allied intervention in Vladivostok  Good  0,77%  -3,08%  -2,31% 
                                                 
74 Events have been chosen with regard to the bond prices problematic, the selection is mainly based on Avenel (2001), Footman (1961), Gleichen (1988), Mawdsley 
(1997) and Salomoni (1997). Appendix 3 is thus not exhaustive.  
75 We consider the Anti-Bolshevik side, thus the fall of the city means a Bolshevik success.   31
August 6, 1918  Kazan
76 conquered  Good  1,16%  -2,33%  -0,78% 
August 30, 1918  Assassination attempt on Lenin (failed)  Good  0,95%  0,95%  -0,08% 
September 9, 1918  Anarchy in Petrograd. Bolsheviks massacre the "bourgeoisie". 
Threat to execute British officials. 
Bad 0,95%  -4,91%  -5,71% 
September 10, 1918  Bolsheviks capture Kazan  Bad  1,20%  -4,80%  -3,84% 
September 16, 1918  Archangel front: successful operation by naval units and Allied 
troops  
Good 1,01% 6,72% 3,78% 
September 20, 1918  Reported set-back of Czecho-Slovaks on the Volga  Bad  -3,14% -3,14%  -11,37% 
October 8, 1918  Red Army occupies Samara  Bad  1,54%  0,00%  2,31% 
November 5, 1918  Resignation of Siberian Government in favor of "All-Russian 
Government". 
? 0,78%  -2,26%  2,72% 
November 13, 1918  Soviet repudiate the Brest-Litovsk Treaty  Good  2,36%  2,36%  0,71% 
November 18, 1918  Kolchak coup with British support  ?  -0,77% -3,08%  -3,08% 
December 17, 1918  French land in Odessa  Good  0,25%  0,00%  -1,67% 
December 24, 1918  Perm is taken by Kolchak  Good  -5,08% -5,08%  -5,93% 
December 26, 1918  Bolsheviks advance in Estonia reported  Bad  -5,08% -5,08%  -5,93% 
                                                 
76 Soviets had hidden the Russian gold reserve in this city (Avenel (2001)).   32
APPENDIX 4: Main military events in Russia during 1919
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January 23, 1919  Bolsheviks attack Archangel front at Shenkursk, 180 miles 
south of Archangel; Allies withdraw 
Bad  -0,96% -2,80% -4,40% 
February 6, 1919  General Wrangel victory in the Caucasus  Good  1,67%  0,00%  -2,50% 
February 14, 1919  Denikin offensive  Good  0,86%  1,72%  0,00% 
March 13, 1919  Kolchak launches spring offensive  Good  2,33%  3,72%  0,47% 
March 17, 1919  Rumors of French and Allies evacuating Odessa  Bad  -3,14%  -3,14%  -4,93% 
March 21, 1919  Allied decision to withdraw forces from Russia  Bad  0,56%  -0,93%  -4,21% 
April 8, 1919  Bolsheviks expel French from Odessa  Bad  -2,91%  -3,88%  -2,91% 
April 23-25, 1919  Denikin and Kolchak victories  Good  6,53%  7,72%  9,31% 
May 13, 1919  Successes by General Denikin in Southern Russia. Meanwhile, 
Estonian army moves on Petrograd 
Good  5,36% 5,36% 6,96% 
May 26, 1919  Kolchak recognized by Denikin, and get formal support of 
Allies 
Good  0,83% 3,33% 4,17% 
June 9, 1919  Kolchak defeated  Bad  -1,67%  0,00%  3,33% 
June 12, 1919  France, Great-Britain, Italy and the USA extend support to 
Kolchak 
Good  3,63% 6,22% 7,08% 
June 16, 1919  Tsaritsyn conquered by Denikin  Good  0,81%  0,81%  0,81% 
July 1, 1919  Soviet troops reoccupy Perm  Bad  -0,81%  -5,69%  -2,86% 
July 3, 1919  Denikin moves to attack Moscow  Good  -1,69%  0,85%  0,08% 
September 27, 1919  Allies evacuate Archangel  Bad  -0,44%  2,21%  0,88% 
October 14, 1919  Denikin troops reach Orel  Good  0,00%  7,96%  10,62% 
October 20, 1919  Denikin defeated, general retreat of White armies  Bad  0,81%  -3,23%  -4,03% 
November 14, 1919  Fall of Omsk and final defeat of Yudenich  Bad  -0,43%  -0,87%  -4,33% 
December 24, 1919  Anti-Kolchak revolt in Irkutsk  Bad  -1,98%  -5,94%  NA 
                                                 
77 Events have been chosen with regard to the bond prices problematic. Appendix 3 is thus not exhaustive.    33
APPENDIX 5: WWI main military events, political recognition and the Peace Treaties
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March 21, 1918  German offensive (Spring push)  Bad  -2,00%  -7,00%  -5,50% 
March 23, 1918  German troops reach line of Somme, Bombardment of Paris by 
long-range artillery (74 miles) begins 
Bad  -5,10% -4,29% -2,55% 
March 26, 1918  Foch, general commander of the Allied troops  Good  0,21%  1,81%  1,81% 
April 4, 1918  Germans attack in force between Somme and Avre rivers  Bad  -2,56%  -4,10%  -6,36% 
April 9, 1918  Second German spring offensive  Bad  -0,22%  -1,63%  -2,17% 
May 27, 1918  Ludendorff Offensive (3
rd spring offensive)  Bad  -1,01%  -2,51%  -5,53% 
June 9, 1918  4
th German Spring offensive  Bad  1,56%  -1,04%  -1,04% 
July 15, 1918  Foch offensive  Good  0,53%  2,88%  6,73% 
September 25, 1918  Surprise attack by the German   Bad  -7,00%  -2,06%  0,82% 
September 26, 1918  Final Franco-American offensive of the war  Good  5,31%  5,31%  11,50% 
November 8, 1918  Rethondes meeting (armistice preliminary)  Good  1,58%  3,32%  9,37% 
November 11, 1918  Armistice  Good  1,93%  4,33%  4,33% 
January  21,  1919  US President Wilson suggests a meeting with Soviet 
representative 
Good 1,63%  0,65%  -2,85% 
May 3, 1919  Article 116 of Versailles Treaty adopted by the council of Four  Good  5,36%  8,93%  2,68% 
June 28, 1919  Signature of Versailles Treaty  ?  0,41%  0,00%  -2,86% 
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January 27, 1918  British exchange of T-Bills  Good  2,93%  7,32%  13,17% 
January 31, 1918  France will pay the February coupons  Good  4,55%  5,45%  0,00% 
March 3, 1918  Brest-Litovsk Treaty : Russian debt held by German citizens 
recognized 
Bad -0,50%  -3,52%  -4,72% 
March 13, 1918  British government pays March coupon  Good  0,53%  2,67%  4,81% 
March 13, 1918  Formation of the Committee of issuing bourses  Good  0,53%  2,67%  4,81% 
March 31, 1918  End of French and British debt servicing  Bad  1,57%  -0,52%  -3,66% 
August 5, 1918  Creation of the « Commission générale pour la protection des 
intérêts français en Russie » 
Good -0,77%  -3,08%  -2,31% 
August 27, 1918  Gold transfer related to Brest-Litovsk Treaty  Bad  -1,18%  -1,10%  -0,16% 
September 19, 1918  French coupon exchange law is passed  Good  0,39%  -2,76%  -11,02% 
September 28, 1918  Comité de Défense des porteurs de Fonds d’Etat russes, de 
valeurs garanties par l’Etat russe et d’emprunts municipaux 
Good 2,52%  5,04% 7,98% 
October 14, 1918  Payment of German held bonds  ?  0,00%  -0,75%  -2,26% 
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